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SECURED TRANSACTIONS-PURCHASE MONEY AND
AFTER-ACQUIRED PROPERTY SECURITY INTERESTS-
PRIORITY OF SECURITY INTERESTS UNDER UCC 9-312
International Harvester Credit Corp. v. American National Bank,
296 So. 2d 32 (Fla. 1974)
I. INTRODUCTION
The innovative provisions of section 9-312 of the Uniform Com-
mercial Code (Code)' were drafted to remedy the complexities and
pitfalls once confronted in the determination of priorities among con-
flicting security interests in the same collateral. In response to the
pre-Code preference for the priority of conditional sales security in-
terests, 2 subsection 9-312(4)3 provides a means by which "purchase
money security interests in collateral other than inventory, 4 can
obtain priority over conflicting and even prior security interests.
This special priority for purchase money interests is qualified only
to the extent that the purchase money interest must be perfected
"at the time the debtor receives possession of the collateral or within
ten days thereafter."5  This qualification is intended as a safeguard
for the benefit of pre-existing secured creditors of the debtor and
I. UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 9-312 [hereinafter cited as UCC]. Unless
otherwise specified, the 1972 Official Text 'of the Code will be employed throughout
this analysis. The 1972 version is used rather than the more widely adopted 1962
version because: (1) the 1972 text, being more recent, is probably more representa-
tive of the direction in which the states revising their Codes will move; (2) pre-1972
variances from the intended interpretation and application of the Code may well have
motivated the draftsmen of the 1972 text to articulate the purposes of the Code
better; and (3) the 1972 Code and its accompanying Appendix are helpful in de-
termining the draftsmen's opinions on both the various shortcomings of earlier ver-
sions and how the revisions may better implement the desired effect of the Code.
It should be noted, however, that under the facts of International Harvester, no
differences in effect result from the application of the 1972 version or the 1962 ver-
sion of UCC § 9-312.
2. Pre-Code law generally sought to protect the purchase money security in-
terest against after-acquired property interests and other types of security interests
and liens. UCC § 9-312, Comment 3.
3. UCC § 9-312(4) states:
A purchase money security interest in collateral other than inventory has
priority over a conflicting security interest in the same collateral or its
proceeds if the purchase money security interest is perfected at the time the
debtor receives possession of the collateral or within ten days thereafter.
4. Id.
5. Id.
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those contemplating extensions of credit to or purchases from the
debtor. In order for any such party to evaluate its risk of loss
accurately vis-iL-vis the extent of encumbrance upon the debtor's
possessions, the system must impose upon the efficacious purchase
money interest the obligation of public notice. Should the pur-
chase money security interest fail to meet this lone qualification for
perfection of an otherwise bona fide purchase money interest,6 the
special priority is lost.7 The purchase money interest is thus left to
compete for priority with conflicting security interests under the "gen-
eral or residual rules of priority" of subsection 9-312(5) "which are
to apply when none of the 'special rules' is applicable."8
On February 13, 1974, the Supreme Court of Florida utilized the
provisions of section 9-312 in International Harvester Credit Corp.
v. American National Bank.9 The majority opinion is certain to
arouse apprehension and anxiety among those affected by the opera-
tion of section 9-312, and the facts of that case are a particularly
good illustration of the confrontations which arise under that sec-
tion. On April 8, 1969, Machek Farms executed a retail installment
note and security agreement with American National Bank of Jack-
sonville ("Bank") which encumbered all property thereafter ac-
quired by Machek. The Bank filed its financing statement two days
later on April 10, 1969. On April 25, 1969, Florida Truck and
Tractor Company sold and delivered two items of farm equipment
6. UCC § 9-107 provides the basis and the criteria for a bona fide purchase
money security interest. It states:
A security interest is a "purchase money security interest" to the extent
that it is
(a) taken or retained by the seller of the collateral to secure all or
part of its price; or
(b) taken by a person who by making advances or incurring an obli-
gation gives value to enable the debtor to acquire rights in or the
use of collateral if such value is in fact so used.
7. UCC § 9-312(5) states:
In all cases not governed by other rules stated in this section (includ-
ing cases of purchase money security interests which do not qualify for
the special priorities set forth in subsections (3) and (4) of this section),
priority between conflicting security interests in the same collateral shall
be determined according to the following rules:
(a) Conflicting security interests rank according to priority in time
of filing or perfection. Priority dates fiom the time a filing is
first made covering the collateral or the time the security interest
is first perfected, whichever is earlier, provided that there is no pe-
riod thereafter when there is neither filing nor perfection.
(b) So long as conflicting security interests are unperfected, the first
to attach has priority.
8. II G. GILMORE, SECURITY INTERESTS IN PERSONAL PROPERTY § 34.1 (1965)
[hereinafter cited as GILMORE].
9. 296 So. 2d 32 (Fla. 1974).
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to Machek under a retail installment contract. ° No financing state-
ment on this purchase money contract was ever filed. On August 8,
1969, seven additional items of farm equipment were sold and de-
livered by Florida Truck to Machek under a second retail install-
ment contract. Three of these items had a retail price in excess of
$2,500. Both of these contracts created a security agreement be-
tween Florida Truck and Machek, with the goods sold serving as
collateral.11 The later contract was assigned by Florida Truck to
International Harvester Credit Corporation ("International Harves-
ter"). On September 3, 1969, more than ten days after Machek
received the equipment, International Harvester filed a financing state-
ment in the office of the clerk of the local circuit court.
Machek defaulted with respect to all of these obligations. He
then voluntarily relinquished possession to Florida Truck of all
equipment purchased from it under the retail installment contracts.
On December 7, 1970, the Bank filed a replevin action seeking pos-
session of the farm equipment.
The Florida court, applying section 9-312 of the Code, held that
the party with a security interest in the after-acquired property
takes priority under subsection 9-312(5) over the party with a pur-
chase money security interest which was not perfected within ten
days after the debtor took possession of the collateral. 2 This much
of the court's holding was consistent with the majority of authority. 13
However, the court also held that such priority is limited to debtor's
equity in the after-acquired property.14  The Bank therefore was
given priority over International Harvester only to the extent of
Machek's equity in the property. The court's allocation of priorities
in such a manner seems to be more a product of pre-Code law than
of the Code provisions upon which the court justified its interpreta-
tion. This can best be illustrated by a careful analysis of pre-Code
law, followed by a careful examination of the Florida decision in
light of the current Code provisions.
10. Each of the two items had a purchase price of less than $2,500, but together
had a combined price of approximately $4,000. As to whether the security interest
in these two items of equipment with an aggregate price in excess of $2,500 should
be deemed perfected without filing, as held by the Florida Supreme Court in Inter-
national Harvester, see 3 FLA. ST. U.L. REV. 150 (1975); notes 101-08 infra and
accompanying text.
11. For a description of these contracts, see the trial court opinion, American
Nat'l Bank v. International Harvester Credit Corp., 269 So. 2d 726, 727-29 (Fla.
App. 1972).
12. See note 70 infra.
13. 296 So. 2d 32, 35 (Fla. 1974).
14. Id. at 35.
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II. PRE-CODE PURCHASE MONEY PRIORITY
Prior to the adoption of the Uniform Commercial Code, the con-
ditional sales agreement"s enjoyed a recognized preeminence. Mer-
chants and all others interested in perpetuating the growth of the
economy had been anxious to find an efficient means by which an
item for sale could serve as collateral for its purchase price. The
needs of commercial society were filled by the creation of the condi-
tional sales agreement, a device by which a vendor of goods could
be assured of repossessory rights in goods sold until the purchaser
had paid for them in full. The law soon developed the legal fictions
and improvisations necessary to circumvent established impedi-
ments and, thus, to implement the conditional sales device.
This purchase money interest truly reigned supreme in pre-Code
law.16 As early as 1631, the English courts determined in Nash v.
Preston17 that the purchase money security interest was worthy
of paramount priority status.18 This priority was originally used
only to protect the purchase money lienor against such competing
interests as judgment creditors and claimants of dower, curtesy, and
community property. 9 Ultimately, however, the interest became
so favored by the courts that it was given the power to dislodge
virtually all antecedent claims, including the suspect after-acquired
property interest.
20
Although the scope of the purchase money priority expanded,
the rationale behind it has remained the same. The development
and expansion of the purchase money priority was both necessary
and justified. After all, it was only through the magnanimity of the
purchase money lender that the buyer secured the possession and use
of the equipment prior to receipt of payment by the seller. The
purchase money creditor assumed sizable risks, in that it not only
extended credit to the buyer, but also provided the buyer with the
collateral for the debt. If the maximum encouragement were to be
given sellers to undertake these risky but commercially beneficial
transactions, it was quite natural that the priority would evolve and
15. The pre-Code equivalent of the purchase money security interest was the
conditional sales agreement. For a more comprehensive discussion of the various
equivalent forms of pre-Code security devices see Coogan, Article 9 of the Uniform
Commercial Code: Priorities Among Secured Creditors and the "Floating Lien,"
72 HARV. L. REv. 838, 840-44 (1959).
16. See GILMORE §§ 28.1, 29.1.
17. 79 Eng. Rep. 767 (K.B. 1631).
18. Id. at 767-68.
19. See GILMORE § 28.1.
20. Id.
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expand to protect sellers against antecedent interests other than
those of spouses or unsecured creditors.
The primary impediment to the unqualified priority of the pur-
chase money interest was a prior security interest or lien. Some
such prior interests were capable of attaching not only to all of the
debtor's present goods, but also to any goods which would there-
after come into possession. This was the essence of the after-
acquired property security interest. 21 Pre-Code courts and the com-
mercial community had no desire to vitiate the after-acquired in-
terest, for it, too, was a useful and necessary device.22 Often, new
small business operators or farmers who had suffered a bad harvest
would not have sufficient assets to serve as collateral in financing
a new business or a new growing season. The after-acquired
property interest provided such a debtor with an opportunity to get a
new and promising business or growing season on its feet. Like
the purchase money interest, it made certain business activities pos-
sible to persons who would otherwise have been foreclosed from
them.
The commercial necessity of the purchase money interest,
however, proved stronger and more compelling. The commercial
community defended the purchase money interest against any en-
croachment by the after-acquired property interest's "floating
lien." 23  As a result, the priority of the purchase money interest
became virtually absolute.
The conflict between the purchase money interest and the after-
acquired interest was prominently exposed in United States v. New
Orleans R. R.24  In this 1870 case, a railroad had executed mort-
gages between 1858 and 1860, the provisions of which asserted
attachment of all present and after-acquired company property as
security for the bondholder-mortgagees' interests. Upon foreclo-
21. The Supreme Court extended recognition to the after-acquired property
security interest in Pennock v. Coe, 64 U.S. (23 How.) 117 (1860).
22. See GILMORE § 28.2. The 19th-century courts developed what have been
conceptualized as "equitable limitations" to the purchase money priority doctrine.
These equitable limitations arose -out of the fears that purchase money interests
would otherwise have unfettered capacity to devour all of the original security as-
sets of the general mortgagee bondholders.
23. The original device improvised to thwart such encroachment and protect
the purchase money interest was the doctrine of transitory or instantaneous seisin,
whereby title vested in the buyer and then left him again for the purchase money
mortgagee (seller) so quickly that no other existing security interest had time to at-
tach. See GILMORE § 28.1.
24. 79 U.S. (12 Wall.) 362 (1870). For a more comprehensive discussion of
the origins and institution of purchase money priority in the United States, see
GILMORE § 28.
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sure proceedings initiated by the bondholder-mortgagees, it was re-
vealed that two locomotives and ten cars (rolling stock) in the pos-
session of the railroad were also subject to unrecorded security
interests, in the form of purchase money bonds, acquired by the
United States government in 1866.25 The United States sought
priority over the general mortgagees' interests with respect to this
rolling stock.
The foreclosure court held that the United States had a "supe-
rior equity" in the rolling stock via its purchase money lien.26 The
decree ordering that this rolling stock be turned over to the United
States was affirmed by the Supreme Court.27 In response to the
mortgagees' contention that their mortgages, being antecedent to the
purchase money bonds, deserved priority, the Supreme Court
speaking through Mr. Justice Bradley, held:
A mortgage intended to cover after-acquired property can
only attach itself to such property in the condition in which
it comes into the mortgagor's hands. If that property is
already subject to mortgages or other liens, the general
mortgage does not displace them, though they may be ju-
nior to it in point of time. It only attaches to such interest
as the mortgagor acquires.
The Supreme Court thus established two principles. First, the after-
acquired property security interest (or general mortgage) would at-
tach to those items of collateral subject to the purchase money
agreement. This point, however, was limited by the second prin-
ciple, that this interest could only attach to that portion of the prop-
erty to which the purchase money interest holder had relinquished
his rights. 29  In other words, the after-acquired interest attached
only to the value of the collateral in excess of the amount still owing
to the purchase money interest holder.
The many conflicts between competing creditors of insolvent
railroads following United States v. New Orleans R.R. prompted
the courts to confine the priority of the after-acquired property lien
or mortgage interest further to the permanent structure or fixtures
involved. The purchase money security interest thus retained pri-
25. 79 U.S. (12 Wall.) at 363. Ironically, it was the United States Govern-
ment, as one of the after-acquired property interest holding mortgagees, which
initiated the mortgage foreclosure and thus caused the discovery of its purchase
money interests.
26. Id.
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ority in all rolling stock or non-fixture category of assets. 30  The
distinction between nonfixture assets, or rolling stock, and fixtures,
or permanent structure, provided a convenient rationale for separat-
ing the railroad collateral into two separate categories. However,
as the after-acquired property security interest gained recognition
in other areas of industrial financing, the fixture-nonfixture dichot-
omy became increasingly confusing and, thus, less useful. The dif-
ficulty of splitting the collateral into categories and equitably bal-
ancing priorities between the various competing after-acquired and
purchase money interest reflected far more sophistry than sophis-
tication.
The fixture-nonfixture dichotomy and its inherent limitations
were brought before the Supreme Court in Holt v. Henley.3
Speaking for the Court, Justice Holmes rejected the priority of the
after-acquired property interest in the "permanent structure," as al-
most all new equipment purchases in the vast majority of industries
become attached or "bolted" to the permanent structure in some
manner and would thus be subject to such an interest.3 2 Holmes
and the Court were unwilling "to give a mystic importance to at-
tachment by bolts and screws" and thereby dislodge a purchase
money interest. 3   Consistent with Justice Bradley's decision in New
Orleans R. R. 34 Holmes stated that mortgagees with an after-
acquired property interest can take only such interest in property as
the mortgagor has.35 Further, he held, as did Justice Bradley in
New Orleans R.R.,36 that the conditional seller's failure to file or
record the conditional sales agreement was not relevant, as the
filing statute was only intended to protect subsequent purchasers
and creditors.37
The Supreme Court's view of the operation of the after-acquired
property interest in Holt proved quite influential. In resolving con-
30. See McGourkey v. Toledo & 0. Cent. Ry., 146 U.S. 536 (1892); Forter v.
Pittsburg Bessemer Steel Co., 122 U.S. 267 (1887); Myer v. Car Co., 102 U.S. I
(1880); Fosdick v. Schall, 99 U.S. 235 (6th Cir. 1878); Harris v. Youngstown Bridge
Co., 90 F. 322 (6th Cir. 1898); Venner v. Farmers' Loan & Trust Co., 90 F. 348 (6th
Cir. 1898).
31. 232 U.S. 637 (1914).
32. Id. at 640-41.
33. Id. at 641.
34. See note 27 supra and accompanying text.
35. 232 U.S. at 641.
36. Consistent with the common law doctrine that the registry laws were in-
tended only for the protection of subsequent, not prior, creditors. Justice Bradley
had held that a failure to record or file the conditional sales agreement did not pre-
clude its priority when in conflict with a prior after-acquired interest. 79 U.S.
(12 Wall.) at 365.
37. 232 U.S. at 640.
[Vol. 26:708
PRIORITY OF SECURITY INTERESTS
flicts between purchase money interests and other interests that
were "first in time," the pre-Code courts most often resorted to the
"title doctrine." 38  Under this theory the title to the goods trans-
ferred from the seller-creditor to the buyer-debtor was seen to re-
main in the seller-creditor until the purchase price was fully paid.
As a result, if a seller of equipment retained title until the pur-
chase price was fully remunerated, his rights to priority in the col-
lateral-equipment reigned supreme over any claim arising under an
after-acquired property clause of an antecedent agreement since in
the eyes of the court, no property had been acquired. This result
prevailed even though the purchase money agreement had never
been recorded. 9
The purchase-money priority was retained in such statutory re-
forms as the Uniform Conditional Sales Act.40  Although the condi-
38. Manhattan Trust Co. v. Sioux City Cable Ry., 76 F. 658 (C.C.N.D. Iowa
1896); Babbitt & Cowden Live Stock Co. v. Hooker, 28 Ariz. 263, 236 P. 722 (1925);
Goodrich Silvertown Stores v. A. & A. Credit Sys., Inc., 200 Minn. 265, 274 N.W.
172 (1937); Simmons v. Lee James Fin. Co., 56 Wash. 2d 234, 351 P.2d 507 (1960).
In some states, the holder of an after-acquired property interest was limited to an
equitable interest in the debtor's after-acquired property. Provision was made that
such an equitable interest could be defeated by a seller's legal lien interest. See
Metropolitan Trust Co. v. Railroad Equip. Co., 108 F. 913 (6th Cir. 1901); Southern
Surety Co. v. Peoples State Bank, 332 Ill. 362, 162 N.E. 659 (1928); Trenton Lumber
Co. v. Boling, 230 Miss. 233, 92 So. 2d 440 (1957).
39. See Holt v. Henley, 232 U.S. 637 (1914); Myer v. Car Co., 102 U.S. I
(1880); Fosdick v. Schall, 99 U.S. 235 (1879); United States v. New Orleans R.R.,
79 U.S. (12 Wall.) 362 (1871); United States Fidelity & Guar. Co. v. G. W. Parsons
Co., 235 F. 114 (8th Cir. 1916); Manhattan Trust Co. v. Sioux City Cable Ry., 76
F. 658 (C.C. N.D. Iowa 1896). It is interesting to note at this point that the conse-
quences of nonfiling were substantially different in cases where the security agree-
ment was deemed to be a chattel mortgage rather than a conditional sales agreement.
An unfiled chattel mortgage was deemed void against creditors generally in most
states. A conditional sale, often used as a substitute for the chattel mortgage,
was in some states valid against all creditors without filing; in other states, if the
sale was not filed, void only against lien creditors. UCC § 9-101, Comment.
40. The UNIFORM CONDITIONAL SALES AcT §§ 4 & 5 provide:
§4. Conditional sales valid except as otherwise provided.-Every provision
in a conditional sale reserving property in the seller after possession of the
goods is delivered to the buyer, shall be valid as to all persons, except as
hereinafter otherwise provided.
§5. Conditional sales void as to certain persons.-Every provision in a con-
ditional sale reserving property in the seller, shall be void as to any pur-
chaser from or creditor of the buyer, who, without notice of such provision,
purchases the goods or acquires by attachment or levy a lien upon them,
before the contract or a copy thereof shall be filed as hereinafter provided,
unless such contract or copy is so filed within ten days after the making
of the conditional sale.
Section 4 has been explicitly rejected by UCC § 9-202. Section 5 and other sim-
ilar pre-Code provisions were consistently interpreted not to operate in favor of the
antecedent after-acquired interest. See 2A G. BOGERT, UNIFORM LAWS, ANNO-
TATED, COMMENTARIES ON CONDITIONAL SALES ch. 5 (1922); cases accompanying
note 39 supra.
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tional sales contract was required to be filed, 41 the protection af-
forded by these filings did not extend to one whose security interest
antedated the conditional sales contract. 42  Where the after-ac-
quired security interest was antecedent to an unfiled conditional
sales contract, the after-acquired interest was thought to be undam-
aged by the seller's breach of the recording statutes and so was
not deemed to carry the equitable right to priority over the condi-
tional seller.45
In summary, the after-acquired interest holder was subordinate
to the conditional seller's interest and his rights respecting the condi-
tional sale collateral might reach only to the extent of the condi-
tional buyer's equity.44 The interpretation thus applied was that the
after-acquired interest (mortgage) "could not have covered more
than the mortgagor's equity and the title of the conditional vendor
or entruster was prior in time and prior in right. 45  The Supreme
Court of Mississippi in Trenton Lumber Co. v. J. B. Boling46 typi-
fied the pre-Code judicial attitude toward the purchase money pri-
ority:
If the Legislature had intended that a deed of trust or chat-
tel mortgage on after-acquired property . .. should have
priority over the vendor's lien for the unpaid purchase
price of such property, the Legislature would have so pro-
vided. .. .
As if taking a cue from the Trenton court, the draftsmen of the
41. 2 G. BOGERT, UNIFORM LAWS, ANNOTATED, COMMENTARIES ON CONDI-
TIONAL SALES § 5, at 6-7 (1922).
42. Under such pre-Code interpretations, the only instance in which a non-
purchase money creditor could prevail over the purchase money interest was where
such creditor could demonstrate that his advance to the common debtor was made
subsequent to the seller's unrecorded purchase money agreement and in reliance
upon the debtor's appearance of unencumbered ownership. See Spencer v. Staines,
292 Mich. 672, 291 N.W. 50 (1940); Mississippi Valley Trust Co. v. Cosmopolitan
Club, Il1 N.J. Eq. 277, 162 A. 396 (1932).
43. See Simmons v. Lee James Fin. Co., 56 Wash. 2d 234, 351 P.2d 507 (1960),
for a contemporary example of this pre-Code rule's application.
44. Upon resale or foreclosure sale by the conditional seller,
[i]t is of course equitable that the buyer should receive any balance that
may exist after satisfaction of the seller's claims and the expenses which
have been caused by the retaking and foreclosure. Such balance represents
the equity of the conditional buyer, the parts of the price he has paid less
depreciation.
2A G. BOGERT, UNIFORM LAWS, ANNOTATED, COMMENTARIES ON CONDITIONAL
SALES § 121, at 164 (1922).
45. Coogan, Article 9 of the Uniform Commercial Code: Priorities Among Se-
cured Creditors and the "Floating Lien," 72 HARV. L. REV. 838, 856 (1959).
46. 230 Miss. 233, 92 So. 2d 440 (1957).
47. Id. at 244, 92 So. 2d at 444.
[Vol. 26:708
PRIORITY OF SECURITY INTERESTS
Uniform Commercial Code did provide that, in the event that such
purchase money interest did not comply with the filing or perfec-
tion requirement of section 9-312, priority would be awarded to an
antecedent after-acquired property security interest over the pur-
chase money interest.
48
III. THE ADOPTION OF THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE
In framing Article 9 of the Code, the draftsmen were well aware
of the compelling bias favoring the purchase money interest in pre-
Code law. It is stated in Comment 3 to section 9-312 that:
prior law, under one or another theory, usually contrived
to protect purchase money interests over after-acquired
property interests (to the extent to which the after-acquired
property interest was recognized at all) . . . the result
was arrived at on the theory that since 'title' to the equip-
ment was never in the vendee or lessee there was nothing
for the lien of the mortgage to attach to. While this article
broadly validates the after-acquired property interest,
it also recognizes as sound the preference which prior law
gave to the purchase money interest. That policy is car-
ried out in subsections (3) and (4).49
It is thus apparent that the predisposition favoring the purchase
money interest remained a most formidable consideration. Addi-
tional practical considerations, however, dictated that an interest
endowed with such recognized and enforceable supremacy must take
certain precautions to protect the relatively vulnerable non-purchase
money interests. The lone precaution was to provide competing
and potentially competing creditors with notice of the purchase
money interest.
The draftsmen concluded that in many transactions, including
the purchase money agreement, a financing statement must be
filed.50 By providing for and maintaining a policy of strict enforce-
ment of filing obligations, it was hoped that there would ensue an
implicit trust in the credibility and efficacy of the system.5 1 A trust-
worthy system of public notice in the arena of nonpossessory secu-
48. UCC §§ 9-312(4) & (5).
49. UCC § 9-312, Comment 3.
50. See UCC §§ 9-302, 9-312(4).
51. Since it is a routine procedure for anyone lending against equipment already
in the possession of a debtor to ascertain whether the equipment is not already
encumbered, the necessity of constructing the system so as to insure the maximum
accuracy of the records should be readily apparent. Faith in the filing system pro-
motes commerce and the increased trade, at least theoretically, works to the benefit
of all.
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rity interests would provide a crucial element of confidence in a
transaction for potential lenders, purchasers of the subject property,
general creditors of the apparent owner, and government tax-col-
lecting agencies. Delinquency in filing a purchase money interest
would seriously prejudice the ability of each of these to evaluate
their status, whether they be antecedent or subsequent to the pur-
chase money interest. Consequently, the draftsmen have determined
that the purchase money interest in noninventory collateral must
be perfected by public notice in order to maintain its priority.
5 2
The Code allows the purchase money interest ten days after the
debtor takes possession of the collateral to subordinate the rights
of a competing interest (which may have already relied on the debt-
or's appearance of ownership) by filing.5 3 Although such a limited
grace period may seem to be an arbitrary judgment, it actually
represents a compromise between the rights of potential creditors
on the one hand, and the recognition of the impracticality and in-
convenience of an even more limited filing requirement on the other.
To require perfection at the time the debtor-purchaser receives
possession would force the purchase money creditor in a sales trans-
action to deny his customer possessory rights until the necessary
retail installment contract were completed and the necessary financ-
ing statement filed.
Since a significant percentage of conditional sales agreements
are conducted by nonprofessionals in isolated transactions, a re-
quirement of filing at the time the debtor receives possession
would be most burdensome and perilous for those unpracticed in
the expeditious operation of perfection procedures. In jurisdictions
where section 9-401 requires that the filing be made with the Secre-
tary of State rather than the county recorder, the dangers would be
especially great, as such a requirement would entail a visit to the
state capital or other presumably distant location. Since the buyer
would probably want immediate possession of the goods in most
transactions, to require the seller to file his statement before giving
possession would make numerous sales at least more complex, if
not, in many cases, impossible.5 4 The ten-day filing period, although
requiring prompt action on the part of the seller, nonetheless obvi-
ates the problems that a filing prior to delivery date would pose.
Of course, allowing the debtor-purchaser to display the char-
acteristics of ownership for any period of time provides him with
the opportunity to effectuate a sale or further encumbrance of the
52. UCC § 9-302.
53. UCC § 9-312(4).
54. Coogan, supra note 45, at 863-64; see GILMORE § 29.5.
[Vol. 26:708
PRIORITY OF SECURITY INTERESTS
collateral. Aware of this risk, most creditors would be most hesi-
tant to provide a loan on the security of property in a debtor's
possession until assured of obtaining a first priority security interest.
Consequently, a party seeking such a loan may experience lengthy
delays while a creditor insures himself of the adequacy of his secu-
rity. Under the Code, the property owner in need of a loan or
the proceeds from a sale of the property need wait no longer than
ten days for a creditor or purchaser to satisfy himself of the owner's
rights in the property.
Perceived in light of the purchase money creditor's desire to
consummate the transaction, the owner's need to use or sell the
collateral, and other creditors' or purchasers' needs to know the
nature and extent of outstanding interests in the collateral, the
ten-day rule is a sensible compromise. While not interfering with
the initial sale, it nonetheless provides relatively quick notice of the
existence or nonexistence of a purchase money interest to subse-
quent purchasers or creditors.
The sanction imposed by subsection 9-312(5) 55 on a purchase
money seller of equipment who fails to file within the ten-day
period is loss of the purchase money priority. In any contest be-
tween a purchase money interest creditor who fails to file within
the ten-day period and a subsequent nonpurchase money creditor,
the first party to file would have priority.56 Since it is the purchase
money creditor's failure to give notice of his interest that creates
the appearance of complete ownership in the debtor, few would argue
that the purchase money creditor's loss of special priority in this
instance was unjustified. But such failure to give notice is of signif-
icance only to subsequent creditors or purchasers. Those whose in-
terest antedates the transaction are not prejudiced by such failure.
The critical issue still remains: whether the Code drafters intended
that this sanction be imposed where the competing interest is an
after-acquired property interest antecedent to the attachment5 7 of
the purchase money interest.
55. See note 7 supra and accompanying text.
56. See R. HENSON, SECURED TRANSACTIONS UNDER THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL
CODE 89 (1973).
57. UCC § 9-203 states:
(1) Subject to the provisions of Section 4-208 on the security interest of a
collecting bank and Section 9-i13 on a security interest arising under the
Article on Sales, a security interest is not enforceable against the debtor or
third parties with respect to the collateral and does not attach unless
(a) the collateral is in the possession of the secured party pursuant to
agreement, or the debtor has signed a security agreement which
contains a description of the collateral and in addition, when the
security interest covers crops growing or to be grown or timber to
be cut, a description of the land concerned; and
19761
CASE WESTERN RESERVE LA W REVIEW
An analysis of subsection 9-312(5) 58 and the accompanying Of-
ficial Comment clearly shows that the purchase money creditor's
failure to file a financing statement within the alloted period re-
sults in the loss of all special priority traditionally afforded the
purchase money interest, regardless of whether the competing in-
terest antedates or postdates the attachment of the purchase money
interests. "What had been intended was that a purchase money-
interest which did not meet the perfection requirements of (3) and
(4) lost its special purchase-money priority (e.g., over after-acquired
property interests) and thereafter took rank as if it had been an ordi-
nary non-purchase-money interest."59  Hence, as a result of this loss
of special priority, the purchase money interest must compete with
other creditors under the terms of section 9-312(5).
As previously noted, the recording statutes were not originally
intended to protect holders of antecedent after-acquired interests
who had never relied on the debtor's trappings of ownership.' °
Nor is there any reason to believe that the Code draftsmen had any
desire to grant any special favor to antecedent after-acquired prop-
erty interests. 6' Under section 9-312(5) the priority given an antece-
dent perfected after-acquired property interest over a purchase money
creditor who has not perfected within the ten-day period results in
nothing less than a windfall for the after-acquired interest creditor.
This windfall, however, is not necessarily the product of the drafts-
men's solicitude for after-acquired property interests. Rather, the
more reasonable view is that it is a mere by-product of the drafts-
men's stalwart intent to promote the integrity of the filing system
by conditioning even the previously favored purchase money pri-
ority on prompt and proper filing.
IV. THE INTERNATIONAL HARVESTER OPINION
International Harvester Credit Corp. v. American National
Bank62 involves a near-classic example of conflict between a pur-
(b) value has been given; and
(c) the debtor has rights in the collateral.
(2) A security interest attaches when it becomes enforceable against the
debtor with respect to the colfaferal. Attachment occurs as soon as all of
the events specified in subsection (1) have taken place unless explicit agree-
ment postpones the time of attaching.
58. UCC § 9-312(5) states that its general rules apply to "all cases not governed
by other rules stated in this section (including cases of purchase money security
interests which do not qualify for the special priorities set forth in subsections (3)
and (4) of this section) ...."
59. GILMORE § 34.1.
60. See notes 42, 43 supra and accompanying text.
61. See note 47 supra and accompanying text.
62. 296 So. 2d 32 (Fla. 1974).
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chase money security interest and an after-acquired property secu-
rity interest. The conflict arose because the purchase money inter-
est failed to file a financing statement within the ten-day period re-
quired by section 9-312(4).63 Had International Harvester Credit
Corp., the holder of the purchase money interest, made a timely
filing as required by the Code, there could have been no effective
challenge to its priority64 and American National's after-acquired in-
terest would have operated only on the debtor's equity65 in the newly
acquired collateral." It is in light of this result that one may best
comprehend the Florida court's lack of deference to those provisions
of the Code drafted to promote the integrity of the filing system
by sanctioning those who ignore it and to the Code's underlying
objective of enforcing a credible uniform system of commercial law
among the states.
It has already been shown that the Code was intended to invoke
the penalty of loss of all priority where the purchase money interest
is delinquent in filing. This sanction must operate irrespective of
the fact that the competing after-acquired interest was secured prior
to the purchase money interest. 67 The express language of the Code
and its underlying policy notwithstanding, the Florida court held
that the priority of the Bank's after-acquired property interest over
the holder of an unperfected purchase money interest is confined
to the debtor's equity in the property. This decision appears to
be not only identical to the interest's priority status where filing
has been made in a timely manner, but also much more consistent
with pre-Code law than with contemporary interpretations of sub-
section 9-312(5).
The Florida improvisation or "compromise solution" in granting
priority to the extent of the debtor's equity appears to be the out-
come of a struggle between two competing policies: (1) perpetua-
tion of the pre-Code preference foi the "equities" of the purchase
money interest over those of an antecedent after-acquired property
security interest"8 and (2) the obligation of the Florida court to
63. UCC § 9-312(4) requires perfection of the interest within the ten-day period.
Perfection includes filing a financial statement. UCC § 9-312, Comment 3.
64. See id.
65. For a definition of debtor's equity, see note 44 supra.
66. See Coogan, Relationship of Article 9 of the Uniform Commercial Code to
Pre-Code Chattel Security Law, 51 VA. L. REV. 853, 875 (1965).
67. See notes 57, 58 supra and accompanying text.
68. 296 So. 2d at 34. Criticism can be made of the Florida court's determina-
tion that the equities in this case weigh favorably toward the purchase money inter-
est. See note 67 supra. International Harvester Credit had constructive notice of
the after-acquired security interest's priority (via section 9-312(5)) before filing on
September 3. 296 So. 2d at 43. Consequently, even if one were to find inequity
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adhere to the clear legislative mandate in Florida's Uniform Com-
mercial Code. The policy favoring the purchase money interest's
priority status proved more compelling.
The Florida court markedly departed from both the intent and the
plain meaning of the Uniform Commercial Code. First, the Code
explicitly sanctions the after-acquired interest in sections 9-108 and
9-204. While these provisions limit in some respects the permis-
sible scope of the security device, nowhere is there mention of any
intent or design to limit the priority rights of the after-acquired in-
terest to the debtor's equity. Nor does section 9-312(5) itself state
any qualification to the priority granted by the Code. The inclu-
sion of other limitations in section 9-312(5) may be said to indicate
affirmatively that the absence of any limitation on the after-acquired
property interest's priority is intentional.6 9
The treatment afforded similar conflicts in other jurisdictions is
further evidence of error by the Florida court. This issue has been
adjudicated on numerous occasions in the past but in none of these
decisions has the priority of the after-acquired interest been so de-
limited as here.70 In light of such consistent judicial interpretation,
one would have expected the Code's Permanent Editorial Board to
have included a limitation of the after-acquired property interest's
priority among the numerous changes made in section 9-312 since
in the antecedent after-acquired interest's winning priority in collateral which it had
never relied on, to the detriment of the purchase money seller, the assignee of this
seller had ample opportunity to determine that the seller had waived its right to
priority under the Code.
69. The maxim of statutory construction, expressio unius est exclusio alterius,
is appropriate for application in this situation. The maxim may be stated:
[w]here a form of conduct, the manner of its performance and operation,
and the persons and things to which it refers are designated, there is an in-
ference that all omissions should be understood as exclusions. Wheri what
is expressed in a statute is creative, and not in a proceeding according to the
course of the common law, it is exclusive, and the power exists only to the
extent plainly granted. Where a statute creates and regulates, and pre-
scribes the mode and names the parties granted right to invoke its provi-
sions, that mode must be followed and none other, and such parties only
may act.
2A J. SUTHERLAND, STATUTES AND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION § 47.23 (4th ed.
1972) (footnotes omitted).
70. See James Talcott, Inc. v. Associates Capital Co., 491 F.2d 879 (6th Cir.
1974); Galleon Industries, Inc. v. Lewyn Mach. Co., 50 Ala. App. 334, 279 So. 2d
137 (1973); Cain v. Country Club Delicatessen, 25 Conn. Sup. 327, 203 A.2d 441
(1964); First Nat'l Bank v. Smoker, 286 N.E.2d 203 (Ind. App. 1972); National
Cash Register Co. v. Firestone & Co., 340 Mass. 255, 191 N.E.2d 471 (1963); James
Talcott v. Franklin Nat'l Bank, 292 Minn. 277, 194 N.W.2d 775 (1972); North Platte
State Bank v. Production Credit Ass'n, 189 Neb. 44, 200 N.W.2d 1 (1972); Sun-
shine v. Sanray Floor Covering Corp., 64 Misc. 2d 780, 315 N.Y.S.2d 937 (Sup. Ct.
1970); National Cash Register Co. v. Mishkin's 125th St., Inc., 65 Misc. 2d 386,
317 N.Y.S.2d 436 (N.Y. Civ. Ct. 1970).
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1962 if, indeed, the courts' failure to create such a limitation judi-
cially were a misinterpretation of the statute.71  This, however, has
not happened.
The general rule governing priority is set forth in subsection
9-312(5), where it is stated that priority is given to the creditor who
files first in time.72  The priority afforded the purchase money in-
terest is an exception to this rule,73 and so should only be applied
in strict accordance with the Code limitations.74 The proper applica-
tion of this general rule, however, is not left solely to the tender
mercies of a court's application of canons of construction. The
Comments following section 9-312 provide Code applications which
should remove any doubt regarding the statute's effect in resolving
conflicts between purchase money interests and after-acquired inter-
ests.75
These examples show that, in any conflict between a creditor
with an after-acquired property clause and a purchase money credi-
tor who fails to file within the prescribed ten-day period, priority
must be awarded to the first party to perfect, which is usually
effected by filing.76 The examples clearly show that the filing rule
must be strictly enforced. Where the after-acquired property interest
is filed first, it will be awarded priority not only with respect to the
first advance, but even with respect to future advances made subse-
quent to perfection by the purchase money creditor. Nowhere with-
in this example is there any indication that the after-acquired in-
terest priority is limited to the debtor's equity in the collateral.
The antecedent after-acquired interest wins unqualified priority un-
less its competitor is a purchase money interest which was filed
either before the debtor receives possession or within ten days there-
after. From the expiration of the grace period, priority must go un-
71. Another accepted principle of statutory construction is that
Where a statute has received a contemporaneous and practical interpreta-
tion and the statute as interpreted is reenacted, the practical interpreta-
tion is accorded greater weight than it ordinarily receives, and is regarded
as presumptively the correct interpretation of the law. Because court deci-
sions are readily accessible to public view, the rule has special force where
the former construction was made by the judiciary. Thus where the legis-
lature adopts a legislative expression which has received judicial inter-
pretation, such interpretation will be prima facie evidence of the legislative
intent.
2A J. SUTHERLAND, STATUTES AND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION § 49.09 (4th ed.
1972).
72. GILMORE § 34.1.
73. UCC § 9-312(5).
74. See North Platte State Bank v. Production Credit Ass'n, 189 Neb. 44, 200
N.W. 2d 1 (1972). See note 69 supra.
75. UCC § 9-312, Example 4; FLA. ANN. STAT. § 679.9-312 (1966), Example 5.
76. UCC § 9-302 dictates that a security interest in equipment collateral, where
the equipment is in the possession of the debtor, must be perfected by filing.
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qualified to the interest which has first been filed which, presum-
ably, is the after-acquired property interest. This is the clear statu-
tory mandate.
The chief error in the Florida Supreme Court's reasoning is the
court's inability to abandon the common law and its policies in favor
of the Code and its policies, as mandated by the Florida legisla-
ture. The court's bias in favor of pre-Code law is reflected in its
agreement with Judge Rawls' dissent in the lower court. 7  In ex-
plicitly adopting Judge Rawls' underlying reasoning that "prin-
ciples of equity" require that the after-acquired interest's priority
be limited to the debtor's equity, the Florida Supreme Court seems
also to have implicitly adopted Judge Rawls' citation of a 1969 Florida
case stating that the enactment of the Uniform Commercial Code in
1965 could not be deemed to have "[swept] away in one stroke of
the legislative broom the jurisprudence of this state.'T The court's
common law bias is even more clearly manifested in its choice of
authority, in that the only case cited 79 was one in which Article
9 of the Code is inapplicable, the object of the priority dispute
therein having been real property, not personal property or fix-
tures.8 0
A careful analysis of the court's treatment of "security interest"
reveals a rather startling fact: The court, in reality, was not merely
influenced by pre-Code law, but actually decided the case on the
basis of that law, ignoring the Code. The Supreme Court's reason-
ing turned, as did Judge Rawls', on the argument that a "security
interest" retained by the subsequent (purchase money) creditor never
passed to the buyer-debtor and thus "never became subject to the
77. The Supreme Court of Florida adopted District Judge Rawls' dissent in stat-
ing: "Upon principles of equity and in the avoidance of unjust enrichment, the limi-
tation to the debtor's equity in after-acquired property appears to be the better and
more logical rule. We would accordingly agree with Acting Chief Judge Rawls in
this respect." 296 So. 2d 32, 34 (Fla. 1974).
78. Ford Motor Co. v. Pittman, 227 So. 2d 246, 249 (Fla. App. 1969), quoted in
American Nat'l Bank v. International Harvester Credit Corp., 269 So. 2d 726, 732
n.3 (Fla. App. 1972). Upon a reading of section 9-102, one will discover that the
legislative broom was intended by the Code draftsmen to have been so used. The
Note at the end of § 9-102 reads in part: "The adoption of this Article should be
accompanied by the repeal of existing statutes dealing with conditional sales . . .
and generally statutes regulating security interests in personal property."
79. County of Pinellas v. Clearwater Fed. Savings & Loan Ass'n, 214 So. 2d
525 (Fla. App. 1968).
80. UCC § 9-102 states:
(1) Except as otherwise provided in section 9-104 on excluded transac-
tions, this Article applies
(a) to any transaction (regardless of its form) which is intended to
create a security interest in personal property or fixtures . ...
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earlier creditor's claim." 8 If one were to substitute the word "title"
for the phrase "security interest," the court's interpretation would be
indistinguishable from the "title doctrine" upon which so many pre-
Code interpretations were based.82 The Florida court adopted this
pre-Code device simply by dressing pre-Code law in Code terminol-
ogy. In applying the various devices designed to maintain purchase
money priority, however, the pre-Code courts did not find it neces-
sary, as did the Florida court, to state explicitly that the antecedent
after-acquired interest would have priority in the debtor's equity.
Rather, the priority of the after-acquired interest was understood. 3
The effects of the Florida court's distortion of statutory language
are, unfortunately, not limited to producing an incorrect resolution
of the case. Nor are the consequences limited to creating an in-
correct precedent in the interpretation of a single statutory provi-
sion. In a well-drafted and carefully integrated statutory scheme
such as Article 9, such a grievous departure from the clear statu-
tory mandate in one provision creates ripples throughout the entire
statute, raising doubts as to the validity, meaning, and operation of
many otherwise clear and self-executing provisions.
The most obvious effect of the International Harvester decision
outside of its effect on section 9-312 is the doubt cast on the Code's
treatment of the concept of "title." In anticipation of attempts to
invoke the title doctrine to defeat the priority rules of Part 3 and
the default provisions of Part 5, the draftsmen of Article 9 explicitly
provided that "each provision of this Article with regard to rights,
obligations and remedies applies whether title to collateral is in the
secured party or in the debtor., 84 This rejection of title as an oper-
ative concept in Article 9 is further bolstered in the Code's defini-
tion of a security interest which provides, in part, that the pre-Code
phrase "retention of title" "means nothing more than a security in-
terest85 which secures payment or performance of an obligation. 86
81. 296 So. 2d at 34; 269 So. 2d at 731-32.
82. See notes 38, 39 supra and accompanying text. See also United States v.
New Orleans R.R., 79 U.S. (12 Wall.) 362, 365 (1870).
83. See notes 44, 45 supra and accompanying text. For authority demonstrating
that the effect under the Code would have been the same if the after-acquired inter-
est had been awarded no priority whatsoever, see notes 65, 66 supra and accompany-
ing text.
84. UCC § 9-202.
85. UCC § 2-401 states that even if a seller of property does specifically pro-
vide for his retention of title in goods delivered to the buyer, such provision is
"limited in effect to a reservation of a security interest."
86. UCC § 1-201(37) states:
"Security interest" means an interest in personal property or fixtures which
secures payment or performance of an obligation. The retention or reser-
vation of title by a seller of goods notwithstanding shipment or delivery
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The Code draftsmen quite clearly and explicitly indicated that pre-
Code devices and theories of title retention were not to interfere
with the realization of the statutory design. The International Har-
vester decision, by treating "security interest" in the same manner as
pre-Code cases treated "title," may well indicate that the Florida
Supreme Court is rejecting the Code's treatment of title. Through
its treatment of "security interests," the court may well be thought to
have resurrected the operative effect of a body of law that, under
the clear language of the statute, had presumably been laid to rest.
The Florida court's unfortunate interpretation of subsection
9-312(5) priority, as applied to the after-acquired interest, must also
have profound effects on the operation of the "default" provisions
in Part 5 of Article 9. Part 5 of Article 9 was drafted so that only
one creditor-either the lone creditor or, in the case of two or more
competing creditors, the one awarded priority-may invoke the rights
and responsibilities of the secured party upon default,87 i.e., the
costs of taking, preserving, preparing for sale, selling the property
in a "commercially reasonable ' 88 manner, and the payment of attor-
ney fees.8 9 Subsection 9-504(l)(b) describes the party who has pri-
ority rights in all proceeds (beyond the payment of subsection
9-504(1)(a) disposition expenses) as the party holding "the security
interest under which the disposition is made."90  Creditors with in-
ferior rights in the collateral are described in subsection 9-504(l)(c)
as those having "subordinate security interests" and are provided for
therein.9' The problem thus created by giving one party the name of
priority creditor while severely restricting the value of the underly-
ing collateral to which he has priority is that the priority creditor
may have little in the way of financial incentive which could out-
weigh the costs and risks of holding the "security interest under
which the disposition is made."92  Having rights in the collateral
limited to the debtor's equity will, in many cases, be tantamount
to the buyer (section 2-401) is limited in effect to a reservation of a security
interest.
87. UCC § 9-504(1).
88. UCC § 9-504(3) recites the standard of "commercial reasonableness" plus
numerous other responsibilities of the party conducting disposition proceedings.
89. UCC § 9-504(l)(a).
90. UCC § 9-504(l)(b). It is conceivable that a subordinate security interest
might take possession of the collateral upon default and initiate proceedings for
public or private sale. However, once such party's rights are adjudicated and held
subordinate to another creditor, it would be ludicrous to assume that anyone other
than the party awarded priority was intended to satisfy its interest with the pro-
ceeds remaining after payment of the § 9-504(l)(a) default expenses and before
any proceeds were passed to a "subordinate security interest" under § 9-504(l)(c).
91. UCC § 9-504(l)(c).
92. UCC § 9-504(l)(b).
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to having no rights at all. Consequently, the creditor adjudicated
the priority party may wish to have no connection whatsoever with
the responsibilities of Part 5 disposition and the liabilities for breach
of such duties, as enumerated under section 9-507. 93 Under the
situation created by the Florida court, it is unlikely that any party
other than the purchase money creditor would have enough incen-
tive to conduct disposition proceedings, but this creditor does not ap-
pear to be the priority creditor since the court gave that status to
the creditor with the after-acquired property interest.94 The problem
then becomes how to reconcile this anomalous situation with the
plain meaning of the words in section 9-504.
There are four alternatives from which the court could choose in
attempting to resolve this dilemma. Unfortunately, each compels
further distortion of the language of section 9-504. First, because
the court claims to have extended priority to the after-acquired in-
terest here, it may be inferred that such interest should be held re-
sponsible under section 9-504 to dispose of the property upon de-
fault and to allocate the proceeds of the sale as specified therein.
But if subsection 9-504(1)(a) is to be executed as prescribed, the
party having priority must be allowed to satisfy his own interest
with any proceeds remaining after the disposition expenses are paid.
This, in effect, would endow the after-acquired interest creditor with
priority beyond the debtor's equity and thus come into conflict
with the Florida court's holding in International Harvester.
The second alternative would be to allow the "subordinate"
purchase money interest to carry all of the rights and responsibil-
ities of the priority party upon default. As it was the purchase
money interest holder who repossessed the farm equipment in In-
ternational Harvester, this second alternative may be what was pro-
posed. However, such a course is tantamount to denying that the
after-acquired interest ever had priority with the accompanying rights
afforded to it under subsection 9-504(1)(b). While this would be a
more honest interpretation, there could then be no denying an open
defiance of the Code.
There is a third alternative that would require redefining the
after-acquired interest, for purposes of subsection 9-504(l)(b), as
equal to the debtor's equity. The monetary value of the after-
acquired interest would thus fluctuate for these purposes with the
increases and decreases in the amount of the debtor's equity. This
93. UCC § 9-507 imposes liability upon the secured creditor involved in admin-
istering default proceedings for any breach of its Part 5 responsibilities to the debtor
and other creditors entitled to notice under § 9-504(3).
94. See note 13 supra and accompanying text.
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redefinition would only be effective in cases where an antecedent
after-acquired property interest had priority over a purchase money
interest. However, as suggested above,9 if the after-acquired in-
terest is recognized as the priority interest "under which the dispo-
sition is made" and thus left responsible for executing the disposi-
tion duties, it would be unfair to leave it with a mere debtor's
equity. Even where the value of the property exceeds the amount
still owing on the purchase price, the costs of disposition in many
cases are likely to consume a substantial portion of this sum. 9 6 Conse-
quently, the creditor with priority in the debtor's equity would be
given incentive to evade the duties specified under section 9-504.
It may be assumed that the purchase money interest would then be
delegated these responsibilities. Surely, however, if the drafts-
men had contemplated such limitation of the priority party's rights
in the collateral and the preemption of the priority interest by a
"subordinate security interest" as the "security interest under which
the disposition is made," it seems that they would have made spe-
cific provision for such problems and provided some guidelines
for just resolution.
A fourth alternative could require a ratable sharing of expenses
equal to the creditor's rights in the value of the collateral. Al-
though this alternative is probably the fairest of the four, it is also
more exotic and complex. Article 9 only uses such a formula in
one other place and there, in reference to divided priorities, it is
explicitly set forth.97 The fact that the Code makes no provision for
a similar multiple-party sharing in the instant case is a strong indi-
cation that such an interpretation was not intended.
If full priority had been assigned to one party or the other in
International Harvester, the procedural routine of the default provi-
sions would not have appeared to be so jumbled. The disposition
95. See notes 87-93 supra and accompanying text.
96. In situations where the value of the property is greater than the amount
still owing on the purchase price (positive debtor's equity), the unfairness may be
compounded, depending upon whether the party with priority in the debtor's equity
can satisfy those rights irrespective of the reduction in proceeds resulting from the
payment of the § 9-504(a) expenses. For example, if the value of the property is
$1,000 and the amount still owing is $800, the debtor has a pre-default equity of
$200. But if the default costs are $200 also, will these expenses be allowed, for
the purposes of computing debtor's equity, to reduce the value of the property to
$800 and so cancel out all $200 of the debtor's equity? In other words, once the
proceeds are reduced from $1000 to $800 in payment of default expenses, the problem
becomes whether the creditor with priority in debtor's equity retains the rights to
the pre-default amount of $200. Indications from pre-Code authority would sug-
gest that the debtor's equity in conditional sales situations would be reduced by the
expenses of retaking and foreclosure. See note 44 supra.
97. UCC § 9-315(2).
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could have then have proceeded according to the letter of the statute.
Given the problems that the decision creates, one can only conclude
that the Florida court's judicial gloss is contrary to the spirit, as
well as the letter, of the Code.,
The last, and by no means least, of the adverse consequences of
the International Harvester decision is that it is in clear conflict
with the settled interpretation of section 9-312 in other jurisdic-
tions. Prior to this decision, the overwhelming weight of authority
held that neither retention of title98 nor retention of any other
interest by a purchase money creditor who failed to comply with
the filing requirements could frustrate the vesting of full and un-
qualified priority rights in a creditor with a perfected after-acquired
property interest.99 Only timely filing could preserve for the purchase
money creditor the full priority which, under pre-Code law, had been
his by virtue of some title retention device.'00 By treating a "secu-
rity interest" in the same manner as pre-Code courts treated title
and applying the old title retention theories, the Florida court has
ignored the Code goal of a uniform commercial law in all states
and territories. It has pulled Florida out of the mainstream of the
Uniform Commercial Code into the historical backwater of the com-
mon law. Such a retrograde movement carries with it the danger
of other courts following Florida's example, and thus the real
threat of a return to the days of different and conflicting laws
among the states.
A second issue of the International Harvester case was whether
a seller of farm equipment must file a financing statement to per-
fect his purchase money security interest in farm equipment sold under
one contract when the purchase price of each item is less than
$2,500, but the total amount of the contract for all items exceeds
$2,500. The applicable Florida law (which retains section 9-302
(1)(c) from the 1962 Official Draft) states that a financing state-
ment must be filed to perfect all security interest except purchase
money security interests in farm equipment having a purchase price
not in excess of $2,500.20' In applying this statute the court held
98. Mere delivery of possession under subsections 9-312(4) and (5) is sufficient
to transfer title under the Code. UCC § 2-401 states that even if the seller of the
property does specifically provide for his retention of title in goods shipped or deliv-
ered to the buyer, such act "is limited in effect to a reservation of a security interest."
UCC § 1-201(37) defines a Code security interest as that which "secures payment
or performance of an obligation."
99. See note 70 supra.
100. UCC § 9-312(4).
101. UCC § 9-302(l)(c), as stated prior to the 1972 Amendments, was com-
pletely eliminated from the 1972 Official Text. The pre-1972 Official Text of § 9-302
(l)(c) and the current FLA. STAT. ANN. § 679.9-302(l)(c) (1966) state:
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that the seller of farm equipment does not have to file a financing
statement to perfect a security interest so long as no single item in
the sales contract exceeds $2,500.102
The reasons for the deletion of the former subsection 9-302(l)(c)
from the 1972 Official Text of the Uniform Commercial Code are
expressive of the framers' general attitudes concerning the necessity
of filing the purchase money interest. By not requiring the filing
of purchase money contracts in the sale of farm equipment having
a purchase price not in excess of $2,500, the pre-1972 Code (i.e.,
old section 9-302(l)(c)) was more consistent with the pre-Code
philosophy of affording special treatment to the purchase money in-
terest.' O3 The Uniform Commercial Code's Permanent Editorial
Board has determined in the 1972 Amendments that this rule was
detrimental in the context of the Code and should be eliminated
because it did not require filing of the purchase money interest.
In stating the "Reasons for 1972 Change" to section 9-302,
the Permanent Editorial Board explains that "the effect of the rule
was to make farmers' equipment unavailable to them as collateral
for loans from some lenders."'' 0 4 These lenders were hesitant to ad-
vance money on any farm equipment out of fear that a superior
unfiled purchase money interest of up to $2,50005 would appear and
deprive even the most cautious creditor of priority. °6  Such con-
siderations prompted some states to lower the dollar limit from
$2,500 or to delete the provision altogether even before the 1972
Amendments.'0 7 But regardless of the size of the dollar limit, the
(1) A financing statement must be filed to perfect all security interests
except the following:
(c) a purchase money security interest in farm equipment having a pur-
chase price not in excess of $2,500 ....
102. Consequently, the first contract (which was not assigned to International
Harvester) was perfected as a bona fide purchase money interest without the neces-
sity of filing a financing statement. See International Harvester Credit Corp. v.
American Nat'l Bank, 296 So. 2d 32, 33-34 (Fla. 1974).
The court's approach to this issue, discussed in 3 FLA. ST. U.L. REV. 150 (1975),
need not be pursued for purposes of this analysis.
103. Hogan, Purchase-Money Security Interests, in IA SECURED TRANSAC-
TIONS UNDER THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 19.02[2], (1974). This consis-
tency of the pre-1972 § 9-302 with the pre-Code special treatment of the purchase
money interest may explain why Florida has determined to retain the filing exemp-
tion in its Article 9 equivalent.
104. UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE, 1972 OFFICIAL TEXT 767 (1972).
105. The International Harvester holding illustrates that even sales contracts for
farm equipment totaling more than $2,500 might be perfected without filing.
106. R. HENSON, SECURED TRANSACTIONS UNDER THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL
CODE 69 (1963).
107. Hogan, supra note 103, § 19.02[2] n.31 (1974).
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filing exemption has often been criticized for inhibiting the exten-
sion of credit to farmers.10 8  The experience with such purchase
money filing exemptions has further demonstrated the necessity of
strictly enforcing filing requirements and maintaining a credible fil-
ing system.
In applying the Florida court's interpretation to the facts of a few
hypothetical situations, one can best comprehend both the adverse
impact of such an interpretation on the development of a dependable
filing system as well as the problems created by the decision with
respect to default proceedings. Under the facts and interpretation
of International Harvester, the Bank would have recognized priority
only to the extent of the debtor's equity. This equity would equal
the value of the property less the amount still owing to the purchase
money creditor. Assume for purposes of this first hypothetical that
the total cost of three items of farm equipment'0 9 equals $10,000
and that the debtor paid $1,000 on these three items. If at public
sale" the three items sell for the full purchase price of $10,000,
the debtor's equity would equal $1,000. If the expenses to be paid
under subsection 9-504(l)(a) amount to $500 and are satisfied first,
as required by section 9-504, the remaining $9,500 must be divided
between the competing creditors. As the after-acquired property
interest appears to have been subrogated to the rights of the debtor
under section 9-504(2),"' it is arguable that the $500 could be de-
ducted from the after-acquired interest's share of $1,000. This may
be preferred, as the debtor's equity has in the past been reduced
to the extent of the cost of disposition.'1 2 The purchase money in-
terest, by rule of subsection 9-504(l)(c), would be left with the re-
maining $9,000, in full satisfaction of its interest.
In the alternative, if it is determined that the after-acquired
108. R. HENSON, supra note 106, at 69, 88.
109. In recognition of the court's response to the secondary issue of the case
(see notes 102, 103 supra and accompanying text), one may infer that the four items
of collateral within the second contract (contract assigned to International Harvester)
which individually did not exceed the price of $2,500 were also immediately per-
fected as bona fide purchase money interests pursuant to UCC section 9-302 (pre-
1972 version of Official Text) without the necessity of filing. Although never ex-
plicitly asserted by the Florida court, one may thus assume that the only items which
were subject to the antecedent after-acquired interests priority in the debtor's equity
were the three items individually having a purchase price exceeding $2,500. Hence,
even items within the same contract would be subject to different rules.
110. UCC § 9-505(2) dictates that public sale is the only available alternative
here as neither secured party would have been allowed to retain the collateral in
satisfaction of the secured debts.
Ill. UCC § 9-504(2) requires that: "If the security interest secures an indebted-
ness, the secured party must account to the debtor for any surplus.
112. See note 44 supra and accompanying text.
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property interest may satisfy its claim to the full measure of the deb-
tor's equity (extent to which the value of the equipment exceeds
the amount still owing), $1,000 would be awarded to this party and
the purchase money interest would be left with $8,500.
If at public sale the three items sell for only $9,000, the debtor's
equity would be nothing and all proceeds would go to the satisfac-
tion of the subordinate security interest. In this situation, the party
awarded priority has nothing to gain in a default proceeding. Only
to the extent that the debtor's equity exceeds the subsection 9-504
(1)(a) expenses will the priority awarded to the after-acquired inter-
est be of any value at all. If the party awarded priority has real-
ized the folly of engaging in these proceedings, the after-acquired
interest is likely to leave the collateral in the hands of the defaulting
debtor or leave it to the purchase money creditor to incur the obliga-
tions. However,. a situation in which the subordinate purchase
money interest is forced to perform these duties seems contrary to
the formula of section 9-504, which indicates that the secured party
with priority is so obligated.
These examples serve to illustrate that where the after-acquired
interest has been forced to relinquish full priority to a timely filed
purchase money interest, the end results above would have been,
in all probability, exactly the same. This results because where the
purchase money interest complies with the subsection 9-312(4)
filing requirement, it will upon default by the common debtor be
entitled to apply all proceeds remaining after payment of section
9-504(l)(a) expenses to the satisfaction of its interest."' In this
situation where the purchase money interest perfects, even a non-
priority after-acquired property clause would "operate automatically
upon the debtor's equity in the new collateral.""
4
For purposes of a second hypothetical, assume all of the variables
of the above hypothetical, but with the additional factor that the
after-acquired interest provides for future advance lending.' Sup-
pose further that the holder of the after-acquired interest, aware of
debtor's possession of the equipment but unaware of the still-un-
filed purchase money interest, advances an additional $4,000 to
the debtor. It is arguable, by reference to pre-Code law, that
the second advance made by the after-acquired property interest
holder will not meet the same fate in the Florida court as the ante-
113. See UCC § 9-504(l)(b).
114. Coogan, supra note 66, at 875.
115. By virtue of UCC §§ 9-204 (1) & (3) and 9-312(7), an after-acquired property
interest may secure future as well as present advances under the same financing
statement when the security agreement so provides.
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cedent interest,' 16 for it cannot be denied that the after-acquired
interest holder was misled by the seller's failure to record. In this
case the court should at least hold that the after-acquired interest
would have priority in the debtor's equity, $1,000, plus the amount
of the second advance, $4,000. From this would be subtracted the
expenses of $500, for a remainder of $4,500. But the purchase money
interest holder would still be allowed to recover $5,000.
This outcome, however, would be in direct conflict with the ob-
jectives of the Code as they are explicitly exemplified in Example
4 under section 9-312. It is there demonstrated, with respect to
this fact situation, that when the purchase money interest holder
fails to file within ten days after the debtor receives possession,
the after-acquired interest has unqualified priority as to both of his
advances by virtue of his priority in filing. Nowhere within this
example is there any mention of limiting the priority of the after-
acquired interest with respect to either of the advances. Moreover,
in recognition of all of the other considerations mentioned above,
it can hardly be alleged that the draftsmen simply misinterpreted
the Code in its application to Example 4 under section 9-312.
V. CONCLUSION
The International Harvester decision may not greatly discourage
the utilization of after-acquired property security devices. The real
danger is that a substantial inducement to timely filing of financing
statements will be neutralized. In addition, the Code's qualities of
consistency in national interpretation and internal continuity among
the various provisions have been jeopardized." 7
On an individual level, such result will adversely affect all those
seeking to appraise the value of present and future security trans-
actions with a debtor whose collateral is subject to the unfiled pur-
chase money interest. Further, the mere suspicion that a debtor's
property is encumbered with an unfiled purchase money interest
may dissuade the extension of such credit. This reaction could
result from fears of a further retreat toward pre-Code purchase
116. See notes 39-42 supra and accompanying text.
117. See note 70 supra for a partial list of those cases and jurisdictions in dis-
agreement with the International Harvester holding. The possible ramifications of
the judicial gloss placed upon UCC section 9-312 by the International Harvester
decision may be analogized to the various unfounded challenges to UCC section
2-207 resulting from the infamous case of Roto-Lith v. F.P. Bartlett & Co., 297
F.2d 497 (1st Cir. 1962). See Note, UCC Section 2-207 and the "Counteroffer":
Acceptance Unlimited?, 57 Nw. U.L. REV. 477 (1962); Comment, Nonconforming
Acceptances Under Section 2-207 of the Uniform Commercial Code: An End to the
Battle of the Forms, 30 U. CHI. L. REV. 540 (1963); 76 HARV. L. REV. 1481 (1963).
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money biases or the mistrust of a nonuniform enforcement of the
filing rules. Should it become common knowledge that the penalty
for a 9-312(4) delinquent filing is not universally and strictly applied,
it is possible that creditors will come to doubt any past beliefs that
a delinquently filed purchase money interest could not defeat them.
Such doubts would surely impact on the availability of financing or,
at the very least, increase its cost.
The extent to which the Florida court's interpretation will be adopted
by other states is not readily ascertainable. Certainly, it will be a
formidable temptation and/or a convenient justification for those
courts with well-ingrained pre-Code preferences for the purchase
money interest. That it pays superficial deference to the Code makes
the interpretation all the more enticing.
Among the forces which militate against the adoption of the Flor-
ida interpretation, however, are I) the interdependent and sym-
metrical qualities of the Code provisions, 2) the value of maintain-
ing the credibility and dependability of the filing system and the
concomitant necessity of convincing prospective lenders of the value
of such qualities, and 3) authority in every other jurisdiction that
has interpreted the meaning of section 9-312. "8 On balance, one
may only speculate as to the eventual influences of the International
Harvester holding, but there need be no speculation in the observa-
tion that the Code has suffered a setback.
PATRICK A. GUIDA
118. See note 70 supra and accompanying text.
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